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Abstract 
Classical economists mainly Smith, Ricardo and J.S. Mill abhorred public debts 
because of their interference with capital accumulation. J.S. Mill in particular 
envisaged that a rising public debt leads to higher interest rates and falling real wages, 
a combination which may be consistent with a mildly increasing trend in the profit 
rate.  
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1. Introduction 
Classical economists (mainly Smith, Ricardo and J.S. Mill) saw in the rising public 
debt the growth of unproductive government expenditures and the crowding out of the 
private savings which diminish society’s investible product. This view has been put 
forward mainly by Smith and was further elaborated by Ricardo. The third of the 
classical economists, J.S. Mill, contended that an exceptionally rising debt, as this was 
the case for example in the wars of England with France, leads to rising interest rates 
as the public competes with the private sector of the economy over the same pool of 
funds. The subsequent slow down in capital accumulation and the growth of 
productive employment lead to rising unemployment and the ensuing intensification 
of competition among workers for jobs reduces their real wage and so the rate of 
profit may mildly increase.  
The purpose of this article is to show that the core ideas of classical economists 
and especially those of J.S. Mill, on the effects of a rising public debt were justified 
from the available evidence of the period that the public debt of the UK increased to 
unprecedented highs. Thus we put together data for the relevant variables for the wars 
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infested period beginning with the Seven Years' War (1756-1763) and ending with the 
Napoleonic Wars (1793-1815). The remainder of the article is organized as follows: 
section 2 summarizes the views of Smith and Ricardo on the harmful effects of public 
debt on capital accumulation and having to choose between borrowing and taxation as 
two alternative methods of financing the government expenditures they opted for 
taxation. Section 3 presents J.S. Mill’s conjecture on public debt and supports it with 
some empirical findings during the period 1756-1815. Section 4 summarizes and 
makes some concludes remarks about future research efforts.  
 
2. Classical Economists on Public Debt  
Adam Smith analyzes the economic effects of public debt mainly in his fifth (and last) 
book of the Wealth of Nation (pp. 859-900), where he argues that governments should 
not run budget deficits because these lead to the accumulation of public debt with 
destructive effects for the nation even if all of it was owed domestically. Hence, Smith 
takes issue with the widely accepted in his times mercantilist view according to which 
the payment of interest on public debt is an innocuous redistribution of income within 
the country —“the right hand which pays the left”, kind of argument— and he 
characterized it as an “apology founded altogether on the sophistry of the mercantile 
system” (Wealth of Nations, p. 879). Smith based his view on the idea that the 
redemption of public debt in the future will entail increased taxation with negative 
effects on the investment potential of domestic producers and also the flight of capital 
to foreign countries (Wealth of Nations, p. 880). The debt, according to Smith, 
undermines the “natural progress of a nation towards wealth and prosperity” (Wealth 
of Nation, p. 638) since resources that could be used productively from the private 
sector of the economy are diverted by the state in order to finance its unproductive 
activities. Consequently, Smith’s ideal would be balanced budgets, and only under 
emergency situations (such as wars, natural calamities, and the like) the government 
perhaps was justified to run budget deficits and accumulate debt. However, when such 
emergency circumstances arise the preferred method of financing government 
expenditures is through taxation and not borrowing.  Notes Smith:  
The public expence, however, when defrayed in this manner [through 
taxation], no doubt hinders more or less the further accumulation of new 
capital; but it does not necessarily occasion the destruction of any 
actually existing capital [as a result of the reduction of saving]. When 
the public expence it is defrayed by funding, it is defrayed by the annual 
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destruction of some capital which had before existed in the country; by 
the perversion of some portion of the annual produce which had before 
destined for the maintenance of productive labour, towards that of 
unproductive labour. (Wealth of Nations, p. 878) 
 
The above passage implies that taxation decreases mainly the households’ 
expenditures and only to a limited extent savings. Taxation, therefore, unlike public 
borrowing does not encroach upon existing saving. Consequently, the amount of 
money borrowed by the government crowds out an equal amount of private 
investment. Hence, the underlying idea is that for Smith and the classical economists 
in general, “an act of saving is at the same time an act of investment”. In short, 
taxation interferes with new investment and thus with the accumulation of new capital 
leaving the existing productive capacity intact, the same is not true, however, with 
public borrowing which undermines the existing productive capacity by displacing 
savings from the “maintenance of productive labour” to unproductive and wasteful 
usages. Hence, some caution should be applied because most classical economists did 
not have a very precise idea of what is investment. Most of them, by investment they 
mean mainly the wage fund, that is, the amount of money put aside by entrepreneurs 
in order to employ labor and perhaps another much smaller sum which could be either 
in money form or materials in order to carry out the production process smoothly. 
Investment goods proper were not so much in their perspective as they are for modern 
economists.1 
David Ricardo shares Smith’s views on the unproductive character of government 
expenditures and on the notion that their financing via public borrowing “consumes” 
the investible product, and, therefore, it becomes detrimental to society’s capacity to 
accumulate wealth. Notes Ricardo: 
[The system of borrowing] is a system which tends to make us less 
thrifty—to blind us to our real situation. If the expense of a war be 40 
millions per annum, and the share which a man would have to contribute 
towards that annual expense were 100l., he would endeavour, on being at 
once called upon for this portion, to save speedily the 100l. from his 
income. By the system of loans, he is called upon to pay only the interest 
of this 100l., or 5l. per annum, and considers that he does enough by 
saving this 5l. from his expenditure, and then deludes himself with the 
belief, that he is as rich as before. (Principles, p. 247)  
 
                                                 
1 This issue appears for example in the Ricardo Malthus debates on commodity gluts (for a summary 
Tsoulfidis, 2010, ch, 6). 
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A similar argument was formulated three years later in his article on the Funding 
System (1820) (Works IV), where Ricardo evaluates three ways of financing a war of 
an annual cost of 20.000.000l. First, through direct taxation of 20.000.000l; second, 
through a loan, where the government will pay annually a specified sum in perpetuity 
and in agreed interest rate; if for example the interest rate is 5% and remains constant, 
then the annual sum will be 1.000.000l; third with a loan which will be paid in a 
specific time interval. If, for example, the interest rate is 5% and remains constant, 
then the annual payments of taxes will be counterbalanced with 1.000.000l plus a 
sum; for example with 200.000l for the settlement of loan, whose maturity date is 
calculated to 45 years. From these three ways of financing, Ricardo argues that the 
first is preferred over the others (Works IV, p. 186). 
Ricardo further explains the two methods of financing (taxation vs. borrowing) 
“in point of economy, there is no real difference” and this has been taken, by some 
economists, literally to mean the economic effects of the mode of financing are equal. 
Buchanan (1976) has coined the term “Ricardian Equivalence Theorem” and 
attributed it to Barro (1974), whose argument is that the policy of cutting taxation 
through the issue of bonds in the effort to raise aggregate demand cannot but fail, 
because the public anticipates the future increase in taxation for the payment of 
interest on the public debt and thus consumption expenditures fall. As a consequence, 
the final effects of deficit spending are similar regardless of the mode of financing. 
This argument lends support to the idea of ineffectiveness of government policies and 
became particularly popular in the 1980s. However, on further examination of 
Ricardo’s text it becomes abundantly clear that the “equivalence” refers only to the 
collection cost and not to the economic effects of the two alternative methods of 
financing of government expenditures (see also O’Driscoll, 1977).2 First, because 
with taxation people are less willing to engage in an expensive and lasting war and 
second public borrowing means consumption of savings, and therefore slow down in 
capital accumulation (Works IV, p. 186).3 In the exceptional case, when the public 
deficit is financed through taxation it may produce in the short-run, the same results 
with those that would be caused from public borrowing. Ricardo argues that in the 
long run, the ruinous results of public borrowing in society’s capacity to accumulate 
are even worse than those caused by taxation. The rationale is similar to Smith’s, that 
                                                 
2 For Ricardo’s views on public debt see also see Churchman (2001) and Dome (2004). 
3 Smith also makes similar points (Wealth of Nations, p.878) 
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is, borrowing doubtless “consumes” available savings, while the incidence of 
taxation is on current incomes for which we do not really know whether they were to 
be invested or consumed. In a letter to McCouloch (3/29/1820) Ricardo reiterates his 
views on public debt under the most difficult circumstances to defend them and these 
are in the case of war financing. He notes: 
But when we are carrying on an expensive war and I is necessary to raise 
large funds within the year, either by loan, or by taxes equal in amount to 
such loan the former will I think be most injurious to the labourer, because 
it will more materially affect the accumulation of capital. (Works VIII, p. 
170) 
 
The reason is that in case of taxation, the consumption expenditures (especially of the 
rich consumers) will fall for one year in order to pay for the tax but the next year(s) 
the economy is expected to return to normality. 
One could argue that Ricardo does not take into account the inter-generational 
effects of public debt and that the current generation given its limited time, perhaps, 
may not care so much about the tax, since what will pay at the end will be less than 
what they are called to pay once and for all. However, Ricardo explains that the 
economic unit of his analysis should include the household and not just the individual 
and by doing so, Ricardo makes the household an institution with infinite life time 
(since the income and the assets in general are transferred to the next generation as 
bequests) and thus his initial assumption about the difference in the method of 
financing still holds (Works IV, pp. 186-7). 
 
3. J.S. Mill and his Conjecture 
J.S. Mill argued along similar lines with Smith and Ricardo with regards to the 
alternative methods of financing of public expenditures. In fact, J.S. Mill qualified his 
view by arguing that public debt might be beneficial for a country, when it is financed 
from excess foreign savings, also when government borrowing generates savings that 
would otherwise have not taken place and finally when government borrowing 
absorbs domestic savings that would be either invested unproductively or invested in 
foreign countries. For example, in the case of unproductive government expenditures, 
he notes:  
[…] if the capital taken in loans is abstracted from funds either engaged in 
production, or destined to be employed in it, their diversion from that 
purpose is equivalent to taking the amount from the wages of the 
labouring classes. (J.S. Mill, 1845, p. 230) 
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Moreover, J.S. Mill (1845, p. 231) argued that insofar as loans absorb the 
investible product and under normal circumstance offset partially or wholly the 
falling tendency in the interest rate. In the unusual case of wars when the government 
urgently needs to finance its expenditures, as for example, was the case in the wars 
with France (1793-1815) the interest rates may increase. This increase in the interest 
rate, J.S. Mill argued constitutes prima facie evidence that the government is in direct 
competition against the private sector for funds that were destined to be invested 
productively (or rather in the private sector) and the state with the power of its 
authority diverts these funds to finance its unproductive activities. Notes J.S. Mill: 
When they do raise the rate of interest, as they did in a most extraordinary 
degree during the French war, this is positive proof that the government is 
a competitor for capital with the ordinary channels, of productive 
investment, and is carrying off, not merely funds which would not, but 
funds which would, have found productive employment within the 
country. (J.S. Mill, 1845, p. 232) 
 
Also J.S. Mill takes stock of the argument that the increase in the interest rate is 
caused by the increase of the rate of profit, and he argues that the causa causans of all 
the variables is the exceptionally rising public debt which by decreasing the private 
capital leads to a two-front competition: the firsts against private capital over liquid 
funds and this is manifested directly in the increase in the interest rate and the second 
of workers against workers over employment positions which reduces the real wage 
(or, more precisely, the wage fund) which is equivalent to saying that the economy’s 
rate of profit is increased. 
If it be objected that interest only rose because profits rose, I reply that this 
does not weaken, but strengthens, the argument. If the government loans 
produced the rise of profits by the great amount of capital which they 
absorbed, by what means can they have had this effect, unless by lowering 
the wages of labour? (J.S. Mill, 1845, p. 232) 
 
Having established the theoretical relationships among the four variables, that is, 
public debt, interest rate, profit rate and real wage, J.S. Mill essentially identified the 
necessary variables of the classical model of public debt which is ready to be 
submitted to empirical testing. Given the availability of data, the most suitable period 
for testing the hypothesis of the classical economists is the one that starts with the 
Seven-Years War (1756-1763), continues with the War of the American 
Independence (1775-1783) and of course the fifteen years Wars with France that were 
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carried out in two phases: the first from 1793 up to 1801 and the second from 1803 
until 1815. Consequently, starting from the year 1756 and ending in the year 1815 a 
period of six decades the time span is sufficiently long to study the economic 
consequences of the war-induced public debt on the relevant variables.  
There is no doubt that this time period of sixty years the public debt increased to 
unprecedented highs and this has been well documented in the empirical literature. 
More specifically, Mitchell (1988) finds that the ratio of public debt to GDP in the 
UK rose from 137% in 1759 to 197% in 1801 and it was maintained approximately in 
this level until 1811, while in 1821 it was ejected to 288%. Barro (1989, p. 238) gives 
more conservative estimates of the public debt to GDP ratio, according to which it 
was at the 90% in 1750 and increased to 140% in 1764, it fell to 100% in 1775 and 
increased to 130% ten years later and to 160% in 1816. More recently, Camen and 
Rogoff (2011) in their study of the evolution of Debt to GDP ratio for a number of 
countries, their findings with respect to the debt to GDP ratio for the UK economy are 
similar to those of Mitchel and Barro with the difference that the actual size of the 
ratio lies somewhere between the findings of the two studies.   
Despite considerable differences, the three data sets convey approximately the 
same picture with regard to the rising tendency of the ratio of debt to GDP. These 
figures further suggest that the relative size of public debt for the UK was much 
larger compared to today’s standards and that the concerns of the classical economists 
about the negative consequences of rising debt on economic growth can be submitted 
to test. Although the available data on the UK economy during the investigated period 
are less than accurate, nevertheless their visual inspection reveals their corroboration 
with the classical (J.S. Mill’s) hypothesis for the economic effects of public debt. One 
could cast doubt to J.S. Mill’s hypothesis by arguing that profits were high during the 
Napoleonic Wars not because of public debt, but because of the rapid progress in 
industrialization. However, J.S. Mill’s counterargument would be that the progress in 
industrialization would have been even faster had the government not absorbed the 
domestic savings during the war and that these savings had been invested 
productively. Figure 1, below portrays the evolution of the variables of interest. Thus 
we display the debt-to-GDP ratio, the interest-rate on consols, which is a real interest 
rate as the price of consols encapsulates the effects of inflation, the evolution of the 
rate of profit and finally the real wage. 
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Figure 1. The Evolution of Debt to GDP ratio, Rate of Profit, Interest Rate and Wages in 
UK, 1756-18154  
 
The relationships among the variables are portrayed in Figure 2 below, where in 
the scatter graphs the debt to GDP ratio is positioned against each of the other three 
variables, that is, the rate of interest, the rate of profit and the real wage in the UK 
economy over the wars-infested period 1756-1815. We observe that there is a positive 
relationship between the debt to GDP ratio with the interest rate, the rate of profit and 
an inverse relationship with the wage rate. These relationships are portrayed in Figure 
2 below; where we also draw the trend lines of the variables which all display the 
expected from J.S. Mill’s conjecture behavior. 
                                                 
4 The source of our data on public debt is Camen and Rogoff (2011), the real wage and interest rate on 
consols is from Makridakis et al. (1998), while the data on the rate of profit come from Mirowski 
(1982). 
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Figure 2.  Debt to GDP ratio vs. interest-rate, rate of profit and real wage in the UK, 
1756-1815. 
 
The correlation coefficients of the involved variables are displayed in Table 1 
below. The signs of these correlations are those expected from the classical 
hypothesis and the t-statistics (in parenthesis) of the coefficients show that the 
strength of association of the variables at hand is statistically significant.  
 
Table 1. Correlation Matrix of Debt to GDP ratio, rate of profit, interest rate and real 
wages in UK, 1756-1815 
 Debt to GDP Interest Rate Rate of Profit Real Wage 
Debt to GDP 1    
Interest Rate 0.511 (4.7) 1   
Rate of Profit 0.593 (4.8) 0.323 (2.17) 1  
Real Wage - 0.400 (3.2) -0.281 (2.28) -0.394 (3.1) 1 
 
 
Overall, we can say that the available time series data, during the period under 
investigation, are consistent with J.S. Mill’s conjecture. Of course, such data were not 
available to J.S. Mill; however, it is certain that classical economists had a powerful 
intuitive sense of the evolution of these variables. We observe that although the 
relationships between the variables are not very tight —the maximum correlation 
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coefficient is 59.3 percent and the minimum 28.1 percent— nevertheless, given the 
complexity of the issue at had, we can attest that they are tight enough to lend 
reasonable support to J.S. Mill’s and in general the classical hypothesis. Thus, by 
inspecting the correlation coefficients of Table 1 above, we find that the real wage 
and the rate of profit are inversely related and so is the real wage with the rate of 
interest, while the correlation of the profit rate with that of the interest rate is positive, 
exactly as anticipated by J.S. Mill. 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
Summing up, classical economists (mainly Smith, Ricardo and J.S. Mill) share the 
view that countries should not run deficits and accumulate debt because of its 
pernicious effects on capital accumulation. Starting from the idea that savings are 
identical to investment it follows that public borrowing encroaches directly upon 
savings; that is, the income ready to be invested productively. Since government is, in 
general, unproductive, then public borrowing amounts to undermining of the 
economy’s capacity to accumulate. If government expenditures are necessary, as in 
the case of a war, then the preferred way of financing them is through taxation and 
only exceptionally through borrowing. This view was expressed with great clarity by 
Smith and Ricardo and it was further elaborated by J.S. Mill, who described the 
precise causal relationships among the four variables at hand, i.e. the rising public 
debt, the rate of interest, the real wage and the rate of profit. The available data of the 
period 1956-1815 lend support to the theoretical analysis and intuition of J.S. Mill and 
by extension of Ricardo and Smith. These initial findings encourage further research 
within the theoretical framework of classical analysis and to its possible extension to 
current global economic predicament.  
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